His real mistake is at the start, where he states and then immediately dismisses the argument that it is causing suffering that makes eating meat wrong in favour of the much stronger idea that killing "a living thing capable of enjoying life" is wrong (p. 125). First, there are problems in understanding exactly what "capable of enjoying life" means, but presumably Law means enjoying eating, sex, interacting with other members of the species, and so on. That's probably a good enough definition of Law's phrase "capable of enjoying life", but is it wrong to end the life of something simply because it has that capability? I don't think that that is why we worry about killing human beings. We worry about killing human beings because they have a much rarer quality: self-awareness, the ability to know that they are enjoying their own life, or not enjoying it, and to make decisions about the course of that life where one of the criteria for deciding is an awareness of being alive as a particular thing, of being a person in fact. This is an experience familiar to every one of us, but unknown to most other animal species.
An immediate problem now arises because it's not easy to show conclusively whether or not an animal possesses self-consciousness. It's easy enough to judge that an animal is suffering or enjoying itself: when hit, a dog yelps and cringes in pain; when stroked or rewarded with food, it shows signs of pleasure which it would like to continue, just as humans do. But we know that other humans are self-conscious because they can tell us in language that strongly matches up with our own experience of being ourselves, of being a self aware person in a world full of other self-aware persons making decisions as living things taking deliberate account of themselves. Animals do not have the ability to do that, or at least no such language ability has ever been clearly demonstrated in any non-human animal. The most popular test for self-awareness is the mirror test, but that is open to criticism on several counts ("Mirror Test", 2010). Since our own self-awareness is the product of evolution and functions of our brain, it is at least possible that other animals do possess at least some such concept of self; that is, that they are in some way persons, not merely bodies experiencing pleasures and pains, and reacting to them, even with intelligence. I don't think we need to settle exactly what other animals do or do not possess self-awareness, thought it seems to me likely that at least some great apes, and perhaps a couple of other mammals, do. And the great apes are not an animal we typically kill and eat. No one has ever suggested that there is evidence that chickens, sheep or cows possess self-consciousness.
If we accept that the relevant criteria is being self-conscious, then that does separate us from most of the animals that we like to kill and eat in a way that avoids Law's charge of speciesism: it is not arbitrary, and we can decide on the criteria before we apply it. However, the point that Golf raised in his earlier comment is now relevant (golf(s), 2010): the distinction between brain dead humans and food animals has disappeared. Worse, the best evidence suggests that no perfectly normal human baby has anything like self-awareness until at least a few months old. We might now suggest other reasons for not eating human babies, but those reasons will need to be different to the basic reason that makes our food animals relevantly different to us. I'm not going to argue it here, but I favour a modified version of Roger Scruton's argument based on potential (as cited in Law, p. 134), where the relevant modification is that we have good grounds for believing that the particular baby will become a normally self-conscious human person before the age of two years. And this is where the philosopher Peter Singer received death threats when he took up his position as professor of philosophy at Princeton. Although it is not clear from the quotation in Law (p. 130), Singer follows through this line of reasoning to conclude that in fact it is morally acceptable for, for example, parents to ask a doctor to kill their brain dead baby, and that it is just and moral for the doctor to comply with that wish. In fact, Singer takes the idea that being a person who is self-aware and able to make decisions that take that fact into account so seriously that he argues that abortion is morally permissible even after birth; that is, that it is not necessarily wrong to kill a new born baby (Singer, 1996). If you like the idea that personhood is the relevant difference that separates us from our food, you also need to consider the consequences that logically follow from accepting that argument. If A logically follows from B, and you accept A, then you must also accept B, however much you might hate it, unless of course you have a relevant reason for breaking the logical chain between A and B.
Singer thinks that eating meat is sometimes wrong, but not always or necessarily, not because it means killing an animal that is "capable of enjoying life", but because it often causes suffering, and that causing needless suffering, unlike killing, is morally wrong. Singer would allow that provided the animal lives a happy life, and is killed painlessly, then there is nothing morally wrong with enjoying it for dinner, and this seems right to me. It might be OK to painlessly kill an animal that has not suffered, but causing suffering simply to satisfy our lust for tasty flesh does seem wrong. Law would have done better to stick with Singer's real argument instead of dismissing it on page 125 (2003).
I do have one more comment that I'd like to make in response to something else that came up in our class discussions on Law's well written and thought provoking essay, but this post is already long enough, so I'll leave my ideas on Buddhism's first precept for another post.
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References
Law, S. (2003). Carving the roast beast, in The Xmas Files (pp.124 - 140). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Mirror test. (2010, August 30). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:34, September 6, 2010, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mirror_test&oldid=381859761
Singer, P., (1996). Rethinking Life and Death. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
And of course, if someone were so brain dead, from an accident or whatever, that they were no longer a person and had no chance of becoming one again, it would not be wrong to kill the human body that was left. This consequence also follows from accepting the above argument in favour or eating meat.
ReplyDeleteAnd probably a couple of others that you might like to follow up.
And a new comment for 2011.
ReplyDeleteThe reasons why I think that Law is wrong will not help Buddhists, whose first precept does normally require that Buddhists who have a reasonably convenient option of eating a vegetarian diet (true for everyone in Bangkok) should not eat meat and thereby cause killing.
Another consequence of agreeing with my reason that self-awareness and the ability to choose one type of life over another is a morally relevant criteria fro treating living things differently is that the same criteria will apply not only to possible intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, if we ever come across any, but that it would also apply to self-consciously intelligent machines that we might create, which seems likely to happen in the not too distant future as the ever accelerating advances in computing continue.
ReplyDeleteJust as parents no longer have the right to kill the five year old child that they have created, might humans also be morally required to recognise the "human" rights of intelligent, self-aware machines if we give birth to them in 2020?
The issues and considerations that are relevant to the morality of eating meat go far beyond that narrow question, as is commonly the case - the laws of physics do not apply only to billiard balls or other narrowly conceived experiments, but to everything in the universe.